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Abstract
We introduce the concept of self-healing in the field of complex networks modelling; in particular, self-healing capabilities
are implemented through distributed communication protocols that exploit redundant links to recover the connectivity of
the system. We then analyze the effect of the level of redundancy on the resilience to multiple failures; in particular, we
measure the fraction of nodes still served for increasing levels of network damages. Finally, we study the effects of
redundancy under different connectivity patterns—from planar grids, to small-world, up to scale-free networks—on healing
performances. Small-world topologies show that introducing some long-range connections in planar grids greatly enhances
the resilience to multiple failures with performances comparable to the case of the most resilient (and least realistic) scale-
free structures. Obvious applications of self-healing are in the important field of infrastructural networks like gas, power,
water, oil distribution systems.
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Introduction
In the field of complex networks [1,2], most studies have been
focused on how to improve the robustness (i.e. the capability of
surviving intentional and/or random failures) of existing net-
works[3]. Much less has been done regarding the resilience (i.e. the
capability of recovering failures). In fact, implementing smart (as
well as economic) strategies aimed at maintaining high level of
performances is a crucial issue yet to be solved and represents one
of the most pressing and interesting scientific challenge. A most
important field of application for the results of such investigations
are infrastructural networks. Infrastructural networks are the
backbone of our society that critically depends on the continuity of
functioning of systems like power, gas or water distribution.
As a standard, infrastructural networks have been designed to
be resilient at least to the loss of a single component; on the other
hand, their constantly growing size of has increased the possibility
of multiple failures which often have not been considered in their
original design. In general, implementing the possibility of
recovering from any sequence of k failures requires an exponentially
growing effort in means and investments; it is therefore viable to
consider implementing systems that are able to recover from k
failures on average: in this paper we will follow such a statistical
approach.
In the field of communication [4–6] and wireless networks [7–
10] self-healing algorithms have recently been the subject of
massive investigation. In general, such strategies aimed at
maintaining network connectivity assume the possibility of
creating anew communications channels among the nodes of the
networks, often with no constraints on the number of new
connections available [11]. This is no the case in infrastructural
networks, where the possibility to create new links among nodes is
normally not available (at least in the short run), since links are
physical (fixed in advance) and creating new ones requires both
time and investments.
In general, self-healing in infrastructural networks should be
though as a constrained mechanism in which only a limited
amount of resources is available. An example of such an approach
can be found in material science where new polymeric compounds
are capable of self healing due to the presence of small amounts of
healing agents that gets released and activated upon cracking
[12,13]. An alternative strategy to ensure the continuity of a
system is to ensure redundancy in the interconnectivity of its
components; for example, when a hole is punched in a leaf, the
remaining vessels are capable to sustain the extra flow necessary to
keep the tissues alive [14].
Infrastructural networks are very well engineered systems
characterised by fluxes of commodities (from electric power to
drinking water). In this paper we consider a simplified description
of such systems in terms of complex networks with a simple
dynamical process describing the flow of a commodity from one or
more sources (production) to several sinks (consumption). We the
introduce a novel healing strategy based on the activation of fixed
redundant resources (backup links) via a generic routing algorithm
and study the resilience of the networks to multiple failures. The
presence of such backup links is customary in technological
networks; hence, our self-healing procedure is within the reach of
current technology. As an example, urban low-voltage distribution
power grids have an almost planar topology and are essentially
radial (tree-like) networks with few inactive backup-links that can
be activated (often manually) to restore power in case of failures.
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Results
Model
In our scenario the system is assumed to describe a network that
distributes some utility following flow conservation analogous to
Kirchoff’s current law; examples of systems following such
constrains are not only power grids, but also the flows of fluids
in distribution networks like water, gas, oil (at least at stationarity).
As a further simplification, we will consider a single node to be the
source of the commodity distributed on the network and we will
not consider any constrain on the amount of flow that can be
transported by any link; hence, connectivity among a sink and a
source in enough to have the sink served. In our scenario, all the
nodes (except the source) are considered to be potential sinks.
Hence, to serve as many nodes as possible, connectivity must be
maximized.
A further assumption is that at each instant of time, the topology
of the network distributing the commodity is a tree (the active tree);
in fact, such a structure meets the infrastructures’ managers needs
– i.e., to measure (for billing purposes) in an easy and precise way
how much of a given quantity is served to any single node of the
network. In networks – like drinking water – where such
assumption is not strictly true, very few loops (i.e. low meshedness)
are present [15].
To model active trees, we start from an underlying network
topology and build up a spanning tree. The set of all possible
redundant links is exactly the set of links in the network not
belonging to the spanning tree. In order to allow for recovery, we
also consider the presence of dormant backup links – i.e., a set of
links that can be switched on – as in the case urban of low-voltage
distribution power grids.
While commodities can be transported only via active links, in
order to implement our self-healing strategy we assume that nodes
are able to communicate by means of a suitable distributed
interaction protocol only with the set of neighbouring nodes, i.e.
the ones connected either via active or via dormant links.
According to our procedure, when either a node or a link failure
occurs, all the nodes that cannot be served – i.e. there is no path to
the source – disconnect from the active tree. Afterwards, unserved
nodes try to reconnect to the active tree by waking up (activating)
through the protocol some of their dormant backup links. Such a
process reconstructs a new active-tree that can restore totally or
partially the connectivity, i.e. heals the system. A more formal
description of the self-healing procedure and of the simulation
protocols are provided in the Methods section.
A natural metric to quantify the success of such a procedure is
the fraction of served nodes (FoS). In order to identify the system’s
properties that are able to maximize the FoS we study the effects
of varying the fraction of backup links (redundancy) according to
different underlying connectivity patterns with respect to multiple
random failures.
In order to stress the peculiarities of different network structures,
we generate class of graphs with different connectivity patterns (see
Methods). We start our investigation by focusing on the underlying
topology which often resembles the actual situation of infra-
structural networks – i.e. nodes disposed over a planar square grid
(SQ). Then, we stress the role of the underlying networks’
connectivity patterns by using the scale-free (SF ) topology
generated according to Barabasi-Albert [16] and the small-world
(SW ) topology generated according to Watts and Strogatz[17]. All
the initial network structures are generated by using the IGRAPH
library [18].
To generate the random spanning trees associated to each kind
of network structures, we use the flat sampling algorithm of Wilson
[19]. We take such spanning trees as the initial configuration of
our model distribution networks. The links not belonging to the
spanning trees form the set of the possible backup links of our
system; among such links, we choose a random fraction r of dormant
links that can be used to heal the system. We then simulate the
occurrence of uncorrelated multiple failures by deleting at random
k links of the initial active tree. Notice that link failures are the
most general ones, as a node failure is equivalent to the
simultaneous failure of all its links.
The source node – i.e, the root of the oriented active tree – is
chosen at random within all the nodes of the underlying network.
The only exception is the case of the SF networks where we use,
according to the preferential attachment principle, the natural
choice of having the node with the highest number of neighbours
(the central hub) as the source.
Our self-healing algorithm is a routing protocol (see Methods)
whose goal is to reconstruct the maximum spanning tree
connected to the source after that a failure has occurred; in doing
so, we use both the survived links of T and the dormant links D;
fig. 1 illustrates such procedure. After the recovery, we calculate
FoS the fraction of nodes connected to the source after the
recovery.
Effects of networks’ topology
In order to test the performances of our healing algorithm to
failures in terms of the service provided after the active tree
restoration, we simulate the model for increasing number of
failures. Recalling that each failure causes a cascade – i.e, each
node of sub-tree served by the broken link is unserved – we
investigate the role of redundancy r on different topologies.
We start our study by addressing planar square grid (SQ)
networks since they are the most similar to the real physical
networked infrastructures. In the first scenario, we generate
spanning trees on a square grids; fig. 2(a) shows the variation of the
restored FoS respect to the number of failures k for different
redundancies rs. For square grids, we do not observe any relevance
of the redundancy on the FoS; this means that a very small
fraction backup links (r~0:1, i.e. 10%) already suffice to attain the
maximum resilience.
The situation is completely different when the underlying
topology is a scale-free network generated through the Barabasi-
Albert model [16]. A widely diffused property of real networks is
that the connectivity pattern follows a scale-free power-law
distribution [1,20,21]. This feature has been found to be a
consequence of the so called preferential attachment – i.e networks
expand continuously through the addition of new vertices which
attach preferentially to already well connected nodes. Although
technological networks do not show power law degree distributions
due to economic and spatial constraints[22], we choose to
investigate SF networks for their marked robustness upon random
failures [23]. For SF networks, it is natural to choose the node
with the highest degree (the hub) as the source. The quality of
service restored by our self-healing algorithm on SF networks is
shown in fig. 2(b). As expected, we find that SF networks can
easily recover connectivity to all the nodes even for low
redundancies. Such error tolerance comes at a high price of being
extremely vulnerable to node targeted attacks: isolating the hub
disconnects the whole system. High error tolerance and targeted
attack vulnerability are indeed generic properties of SF networks
[24].
We then consider the case of small-world (SW ) networks
generated according the Watts-Strogatz rewiring procedure [17].
In the case of technological networks, small-world networks are
important since they highlight the effects of introducing long-range
Self-Healing Networks: Redundancy and Structure
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links in a planar topology. Starting from an initial graph (planar
square grids in our case), we rewire with a probability p a link with
a randomly selected node; in this way we can interpolate from the
case of SQ networks (p~0) to the case of a random graph (p~1).
As in the case of simple percolation [25], the rewiring procedure
introduces some long range links – i.e., between distant nodes on the
square grid) that improve the robustness to random failures.
In order to understand the role of the connectivity pattern we
study our model on different SW networks with different rewiring
probabilities. In fig. 2(c) we show the performances of our self-
healing strategy with respect to an increasing number of failures.
We see that a higher rewiring probability increases the number of
served nodes after the restoration through the backup network;
such a peculiarity shows up even if the clustering within
neighbouring nodes (normally associated to a local robustness
against failures) decreases; therefore long range links increase the
possibility of the network staying connected even after multiple
failures.
Finally, we compare in fig. 3 the effectiveness of the self-healing
protocol across different strategies. Notice that while distribution
grids based on the SF topology are the more robust, they should
be disregarded when considering the case of technological
networks since economic and geometric constraints make SF
networks unfeasible on planar topologies.
Discussion
In this paper we have introduced a minimal procedure of self-
healing in networks. Such procedure exploits the presence of
redundant edges to recover the connectivity of the system. Our
scenario is inspired by real-world distribution networks that are –
often for economic reasons – almost tree-like and at the same time
are provided with alternative backup links that can be activated in
case of malfunctioning. An example of such networks is the case of
urban low-voltage distribution networks [26].
Our strategy could be readily and easily implemented with the
current technologies. In fact, routing protocols represent a vast
available source of distributed algorithms able to maintain the
connectivity of a system; hence, our scheme could be implemented
by the standard procedure of coupling an ICT network to a pre-
existing infrastructure. Our strategy is an example in which
interdependencies among two networks enhance the resilience
instead of introducing catastrophic breakdowns [27].
By studying the performances of our procedure as a function of
the redundancy on different underlying network topologies, we
have shown that distribution networks akin to real world ones – i.e,
based on planar lattices – are the less resilient to random failures.
In fact, the most robust networks – as expected – are based on the
SF topology; however, such a topology is unrealistic for
technological networks. Our results on SW topologies hint that
a very effective strategy to strengthen realistic networks is to add
long range links. The feasibility of such a strategy would depend
on the cost-benefit analysis about the implementation of these
physical long-range links. A further direction of study would be to
consider the effects of more detailed structural characteristics of
the underlying network topologies [28] or even to consider
biologically inspired designs, like dynamic networks inspired by the
human brain [29].
While our minimal model considers only the connectivity of the
system, it can be easily expanded to take account of the magnitude
of the flows: in fact, routing algorithms can account for both the
capacity of the links and dynamically swap re-routing of flows.
Our model easily allows also for cold starts – i.e., for situations in
which the network has shut down due to some major events (like a
black-out) [30]. This is an important issue as one of the most time
(and money) consuming activity after a major event is the restoring
of the functionality of the network.
In this paper, we have considered only the single source case.
Next step is to consider a network served by multiple sources. In
fact, the possibility of separating the system in trees would solve the
who is serving who problem that appears as soon as more competitors
share the same physical line in bringing power to their customers
[31]. Moreover, the possibility for the system of dynamically
separating in time-varying trees would allow for introducing a
commodity market based on real-time economic competition
among the owners of the sources. This further goal is not yet
within the reach of current routing protocols and should be further
investigated if we want to have grids that are smart not only for
their ability to self-repair but also in optimizing consumptions and
prices. Finally, we believe that studying and designing self-healing
mechanisms in complex networks is a promising field of
Figure 1. Example of healing after single link failure. Notice that failure of a single node can be modelled as the failure of all its links; hence,
multiple links failure are the more general event to be considered. (Left Panel) In the initial state, the source node (filled square, upper left corner) is
able to serve all 16 nodes through the links of the active tree. The 4 dashed lines (green online) represent dormant backup links that can be activated
upon failure. The redundancy of the system is p~4=9 as only 4 of the 9 possible backup links are present. The link marked with an X is the one that is
going to fail. (Central panel) A single link failure disconnects all the nodes of a sub-tree; in the example, a sub-tree of 6 nodes (red online) is left
isolated from the source – i.e., the system has a damage D~6). (Right Panel) By activating a single dormant backup link, the self-healing protocol has
been able to recover connectivity for the whole system, in this case bringing back the number of served nodes at its maximum value 16. The link that
has recovered the connectivity is marked with an R.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087986.g001
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investigation where also the dynamics of the systems should be
taken into account [32,33].
Materials and Methods
The Self-Healing procedure
We consider an abstract model of a physical networked
infrastructure described by the quadruple N~ V ,vS,EA,EDð Þ.
Here V are nodes of the network, vS[V is the source node, EA is
the set of active links among the nodes and ED denotes the set of
dormant links that can be activated in order to heal system failures
by re-connecting nodes. A node is considered to be served if it is
connected to a source through a path of active links; all the nodes
in V are initially connected to the source via a spanning tree. As
the basic metric for any quality of service assessment, we consider
the fraction of served nodes FoS counting the number of nodes in
the active graph – i.e connected to vS .
More formally, in the initial configuration, the graph
T~ V ,EAð Þ is an instance of the set RT (G) of all the random
spanning tree of the underlying graph G~ V ,Eð Þ. Thus, T before
the failures has jV j (active) nodes and jEAj~V{1 links among
them. The set ED of backup edges is taken form the remaining
edges of the underlying graph G, i.e. EA|ED(E and
EA\ED~ . The fraction r~jEDj= jEj{(jV j{1)½  measures
the redundancy of N.
We then consider the occurrence of multiple link failures. A k-
failure is a subset EF5EA of k links chosen at random. The
system right after a failure is described by the forest
Tfail~ V ,EA{EFð Þ and by the set ED of dormant links available
for the healing. A healing protocol is any algorithm that, by
activating (waking up) a subset EW5ED of dormant edges, finds a
maximal tree T 0 of G0~ V ,ED|(EA{EFð Þ) containing the
source vS . If T
0 is spanning, then the system has fully recovered.
Figure 2. Self-healing results for networks of size 104. Panel (a): distribution networks based on square grids. The average fraction SFoST of
nodes that the self-healing protocol is able to restore decreases with the number of faults k with no relevant dependency on the redundancy; results
are shown for a 104 nodes network. Panel (b): distribution networks based on scale-free networks generated according to Barabasi-Albert[16]. The
average fraction of nodesSFoST of served nodes is plotted against the number of failures k. Even for a low 10% redundancy (r~0:1), the system can
almost totally heal after sustaining k*4|102 failures; as a comparison, for the same number of failures square grids loose*90% of the nodes. Panel
(c): distribution grids based on small-sworld networks obtained by rewiring a fraction p~0:2 of links according to Watts-Strogatz [17]. The average
fraction of nodesSFoST of served nodes is plotted against the number of failures k. At difference with square grids and scale-free networks, the
restored fraction of service FoS shows a marked dependency upon the redundancy parameter r. Similar results are obtained for p~0:1 and p~0:3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087986.g002
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For the robustness of the algorithm, we will assume that nodes
have only a local knowledge of the networks – i.e., only about the
state (active, dormant or failed) of their incoming links. To build
the maximal connected tree, nodes communicate with their
neighbors via a suitable distributed protocol allowing fault nodes
to join the active network by activating dormant edges. In other
words, nodes are endowed only with the minimal requirements of
routing needed to reconstruct a spanning tree [34]. In this paper,
we have applied the following simple distributed algorithm to
implement self-healing:
N~ V ,vS,EA,EDð Þ/ initial configuration
EF/ failed links
U/ unserved nodes
V 0/V{U
E0A/(EA{EF )\(V
0|V 0)
E0D/(ED{EF )|(EA{V
0|V 0)
EW~
repeat
for all v[U do
choose a random neighbor a(v) connected to V through
any edge of E0D
for all v[U do
if a(v)= then
V 0~V 0zfvg
U~U{fvg
E0A~E
0
Azf a(v),vð Þg
E0D~E
0
D{f a(v),vð Þg
E0W~E
0
Wzf a(v),vð Þg
until V 0|Uð Þ\E0D~
E0D/E
0
D\ V
0|V 0ð Þ
return N 0~ V 0,vS,E0A,E
0
D
 
By definition, the nodes in N 0 are the set of served nodes V 0.
Notice that the state V 0,vS,EAzEW{EF ,ED{EWð Þ still de-
scribes a network infrastructure; therefore, we can in general
describe the state of the system at time t by the quadruple
V (t),vS,EA(t),ED(t)ð Þ and the sequence of time failures between
Figure 3. Comparison among different network structures. Here
we show the performances of our self-healing algorithm with respect to
the quality of service for increasing number of removed links with the
redundancy r fixed to 0:3; for SW networks, the rewiring probability is
p~0:2. The average fraction of nodes SFoST of served nodes is plotted
against the number of failures k.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087986.g003
Figure 4. Different network topologies. Upper panels, from left to right: planar square grid (SQ), small-world network (SW ) generated
according to Watts-Strogatz [17] and scale-free network (SF ) generated accordint to Barabasi-Albert [16]. Lower panels: random spanning trees
associated with the related underlying topologies in the upper panels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087986.g004
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time t and tz1 by EF (t). A general representation of such a
process can be given in terms of time varying graph [35].
Simulations
We analyse the response of the system to k-failures. To study the
effects of different topologies, we perform simulations on different
grids (fig.4 – upper panel).
Classically, engineered systems (especially in the power industry)
are built N{1 robust, i.e. they can survive to the single failure of
any of their components. While checking N{1 robustness
corresponds to checking all the N possible single failures, checking
the N{k robustness requires to consider N!=(N{k)!*Nk cases.
Therefore, checking the N{k robustness is infeasible even for
modest values of k due to the combinatorial explosion of the
number of possible cases. Thus, we choose to assess on
probabilistic ground whether a system would be able to sustain
k failures by a Monte Carlo investigation of the space of possible
failures.
Service operators are interested in maintaining their service
level agreements (contracts) with their customers; to such an aim,
customers must in first pace remain connected to the services.
Therefore, we calculate the average fraction of served customers
FoS after the occurrence and the healing of k random failures. To
do so, we choose at random k different links on the service tree
and delete them; after that, we apply the self healing procedure;
finally, we calculate the FoS as the fraction of nodes connected to
the source. We average such procedure over several network
realizations until the relative error of the average FoS is small
enough (less than 5%). As an example, for a grid of 104 nodes, we
must typically average over 100 sets of random failures to attain
the desired accuracy. Moreover, to average out the different
characteristics of the initial configurations, we repeat the
procedure over 100 different independently generated initial
configurations.
To generate a random spanning tree T associated to a graph G
(fig.4 – lower panel), we apply the exact algorithm of Wilson [19]
that samples uniformly the elements of RT (G). Such spanning
trees are taken as the initial configurations for our model
distribution networks. The links of the graph G that do not
belong to the initial configuration T form the set EB of the possible
backup links of our system; of such links, only a subset ED (the
dormant links) can be used to heal the system. The fraction
r~jEDj=jEBj of such dormant links characterizes the redundancy
of the system: for r~0 there are no links in ED and any failure
splits the tree, while for r~1 any of the links of G can be used to
recompose the system.
Notice that in our case it would be more correct to speak about
N{k resilience, since we don’t consider whether the system is robust
to k failures (i.e. whether it still functioning after k failures), but if it
can recover from k failures.
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